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CLANDESTINE WARFARE: MORALITY
AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS CONFOUNDED
JOHN F. MURPHY*
By coining the term "clandestine warfare," 1 Professor Rodes has
highlighted a mode of violence, increasingly characteristic of today's
milieu, that raises the most profound problems of morality and practical
politics. Rodes has expressly declined to consider the political obstacles
facing those who would need to cope with the moral problems of clandestine warfare. But morality and politics are inextricably intertwined in
this area, and conflicting perceptions of both the morality and the
politics of clandestine warfare have undermined efforts to create an effective legal framework.
Despite his disclaimer, Rodes has identified one over-arching
political problem: states wish to treat clandestine combatants according
to their unfettered discretion.2 The Geneva Protocols of 19771 convincingly demonstrate this sentiment. The Second Protocol on noninternational armed conflict, which one might expect to be relevant to
clandestine warfare, has such a high threshold of applicability that "it
will be a dull and unimaginative government that will be unable to find
an excuse not to apply the Protocol to its own internal conflict."4 To be
sure, the First Protocol, at least in theory, might apply to clandestine
warfare against an allegedly racist or colonialist regime. The attempt
here is to put constraints on the decision of certain governments, particularly those of Israel and South Africa, in dealing with those seeking
their overthrow by violence. However, as Rodes points out,5 this provision is a backward step in terms of the development of humanitarianism
norms and surely will prove unworkable in practice.'
Lack of consensus regarding moral values in clandestine warfare
may be demonstrated by a consideration of Rodes' contention that the
abuse of personal relations in clandestine warfare should be regarded as
impermissible. Here the issue of "military necessity" versus "unProfessor of Law, University of Kansas.
[hereinafter
£ Rodes, On Clandestine Warfare, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 333, 334 (1982)
cited as Rodes).
Id. at 338-43.
Protocols I and I1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, signed
*

June 10, 1977, 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1391 and 1442 (1977).

Report of the United States Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 4th Session, Sept. 8,1977, at 33.
Rodes, supra note 1, at 344.
8 See Proceedings and Committee Reports of the American Branch of the International Law Association (1979-1980), at 38-54.
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necessary suffering," a difficult enough judgment call in conventional
warfare, comes into sharp relief. Rodes finds especially objectionable the
FLN tactic, demonstrated in The Battle of Algiers of sitting at a bar and
dropping off a bomb to blow up unsuspecting fellow-drinkers." But an
FLN partisan might argue in response that such sabotage was absolutely
necessary to minimize (although hardly eliminate) the risk of being
detected. The argument might continue that failure to establish the contact with the people in the bar could draw unwelcome attention to the
bomb carrier.
There is also, perhaps, some question why establishing a brief and
casual contact with one's victim is especially immoral. Why should it be
less immoral merely to march silently into the bar and deposit a bomb?
The immorality of the bomb in the bar or the marketplace would seem to
be based on the noncombatant or "innocent" status of the victims. Even
here, however, some might argue that the French colonialist (or the
Israeli and white South African populations) were anything but innocent
because of their direct support of an immoral regime. One may reject
such arguments and the premises they are based on, but their specious
appeal is a major barrier to efforts to humanize clandestine warfare.
The problem of military necessity versus unnecessary suffering also
arises with respect to Rodes' suggestion that military forces fighting a
clandestine force are entitled to respite and not to be subject to attack
anywhere, anytime.' By definition, a clandestine force is weak militarily
vis-a-vis the forces of its adversary. To attack the adversary's forces
while they are on-duty or even when they are in heavily guarded military barracks could be suicidal. Moreover, clandestine attack at anytime
on its military forces greatly increases the cost, financial and
psychological, to the target government of governing the country-a
primary goal of clandestine warfare.
Rodes' comments regarding the harboring of a clandestine force by a
neighboring state, and the pursuit by the state in which the clandestine
force operates into the state where it is being harbored, raise an issue of
jus ad bellum rather than jus in bello.' That is, the overwhelming majority of United Nations members would not contend that South Africa is
right to fight SWAPO in Namibia but wrong to do so in Angola. They
would argue that South Africa has no right to fight SWAPO anywhere
or, for that matter, to be in Namibia at all. Moreover, most of these
states would not regard Angola's harboring of SWAPO forces as an act
of aggression or use of force in violation of the United Nations' Charter.
Angola is not really claiming the rights of a neutral; it is claiming a
special privilege to support a "just war."
Rodes' suggestion that "[o]nly through the international community

'

Rodes, supra note 1, at 336-37.
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See id. at 350-51.
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and its institutions can we provide for relations between peoples and
groups with different ideological commitments"10 is provocative, to say
the least, when states still zealously guard their sovereignty over matters "essentially within their domestic jurisdiction." Equally provocative, indeed revolutionary, is the provision in his draft convention
that "[n]o person, force or government shall be denied the benefits of
this Convention or exonerated from the obligations thereof on the
ground that he or it or any person, force, or government that he or it is
opposing is not a party to this Convention, or has or lacks a particular
status under international or municipal law."" We have not yet progressed so far from the Westphalian system of states.
These brief comments with their skeptical thrust should not be
regarded as a sharp criticism of Professor Rodes' fine paper. On the contrary, he has done us a service in raising some transcendentally important issues of law and morality. For this we are grateful.

,o Id. at 354-56.
n Draft Convention on Clandestine Warfare, art. 1(4), repinted in 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 358 (1982).

